The introduction of inequity concerns into the Trust Game gives rise to complementary concepts of conditional trustworthiness and unconditional untrustworthiness. When the inequity concern is not accounted for, unconditional untrustworthiness is overestimated. The high proportion of trustees adopting the equal division behavioural norm suggests that an unequal distribution of show-up fees may deter trustors from placing trust, and may eventually reduce the incentive to cooperate for both players. It also follows that increases in income inequality can explain declines in self-reported trust in high-income countries.
Introduction
Research on trust and co-operation has provided appealing, although controversial, concepts for analysis of non-economic sources of socio-economic development. Following the seminal research of Coleman (1990) , Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995) , scholars have empirically investigated primitives of social capital (for example Paldam and Svendsen, 2000) . In particular, differences in GDP growth across countries or regions have been explained using survey measures that treat social capital on a par with more tangible physical and human capital (see La Porta et al., 1997 , Knack and Keefer, 1997 , Zak and Knack, 2001 , Beugelsdijk and van Schaik, 2005 . The results have been interpreted as demonstrating the thesis, put forward earlier by Fukuyama (1995) , that trust is a predictor of economic success.
Non-economic factors in the development process have thereby been given due emphasis.
Because of technical difficulties encountered in the empirical analysis of social capital (see Durlauf, 2002b) and limited reliability of self-reported measures of trust, there has been a focus on conclusions from economic experiments. It is claimed that "experiments hold the promise of constructing situations where questions of exchangeability and identification can be avoided via the appropriate use of randomisation" (Durlauf, 2002b, p. 475) . Also, as explained by Carpenter (2000) , self-reported responses to survey questions are often biased.
In particular, different types of biases can affect attitudinal measures, including that respondents misperceive the abstract situation described by the interviewer. Respondents, for example, tend to underestimate the possible consequences of danger when this is hypothetical (hypothetical bias). In addition, they often like to represent themselves more virtuous than they in fact are (idealised persona bias). When incentives are an issue, survey responses may be unreliable when there is no stake in play (lack of incentive compatibility).
The awareness of such sources of bias in survey measures has redirected attention from self-reported measures of trust and co-operative behaviour to behavioural measures through design of games, resembling real-life situations, not affected by the above sources of bias. The intention has been to allow validation of survey results and the identification of possible determinants of behaviour. However, the experimental approach may also produce misleading results or outcomes that cannot be generalised. This limitation, mainly linked to experimental games where subject pools are composed of undergraduate students, constitutes one of the main critiques of behavioural economics, and suggests caution in interpreting experimental results. 1 Notwithstanding the drawbacks of the perspectives and the possibility of improving estimates of trust by combining the two approaches, most empirical applications to trust rely exclusively on survey data, generally drawn from the General Social Survey (GSS) or the World Value Survey (WVS). The question used to obtain self-reported measures of trust is:
"Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" The replies to this question, included in virtually all major international surveys, are the object of a mounting body of research. Putnam (2000) has noted that, in the United States, the proportion of people replying positively to this question has roughly halved between 1960 and 1995 (see figure 1) . If, as claimed by Durlauf (2002b, p. 475), "social capital seems intrinsically tied-up with psychological notions such as trust, aspirations, and group identification", the evidence on generalised self-reported trust presented by Putnam has implications for the study of social capital. In fact, although doubts have been cast on the empirical validity of Putnam's analysis (Durlauf, 2002a ) and on indeed whether social capital has decreased overtime, the decline of trust in survey measures is not a matter of contention.
2 The attention paid to generalised self-reported trust is also consistent 1 In this regard, Fehr and Schmidt (forthcoming) also show that, besides the age and the principal activity of the respondent, students in economics and business administration tend to behave in a significantly different way than students in other disciplines. See also Kirchgässner (2005) . 2 Boggs (2001) focuses on the evidence on American civic (dis)engagement and is much less critical of Putnam's presentation of the temporal dynamics of self-reported trust measures. Paxton (1999, p. 123 ) finds a "strong, with Bjørnskov (2006) , who shows that trust is the component of social capital exerting the most significant effect on governance.
( Figure 1 about here)
The past-dependency theory (i.e., the idea that history matters) put forward by Putnam (1993) and shared by other scholars (see J-P. Platteau, 2000 and Beugelsdijk and van Schaik, 2005 ) may appear reasonable in explaining cross-sectional differences in the stock of social capital but cannot explain a rise or decline in trust within the same country. The pastdependency thesis needs to be complemented by a theory that can account for the differences observed across countries as well as for changes taking place over time. La Ferrara (2000, 2002) , for example, found that factors such as the increasing income, race and/or ethnic heterogeneity can account for the decrease in the general level of self-reported trust. Putnam's finding should be interpreted with caution in the light of the abovementioned bias characterising survey responses. The question is whether there has been a decline in trust in the U.S. or whether the result is the consequence of an inherent bias in survey measures.
In this regard, Glaeser et al. (2000) have sought to test the reliability of self-reported measures of trust and trustworthiness by conducting experiments with monetary rewards. By collecting information on students playing the game, the authors could identify individual and situational correlates of trust and trustworthiness. Even though not stated in their paper, their approach is consistent with Granovetter's observation that "standard economic analysis neglects the identity of past relations of individual transactors, but rational individuals know better, relying on their knowledge of these relations. They are less interested in general reputations than in whether a particular other may be expected to deal honestly with themmainly a function of whether they or their own contacts have had satisfactory past dealings consistent decline in trust in individuals" and affirms that this "(and its effects on social capital as the combination of trust and associations) could have some potentially detrimental consequences".
with the other" (Granovetter, 1985, p. 491) . Glaeser et al. (2000) implicitly share this view and, with some minor changes, conduct the game designed by Berg et al. (1995) to test the reliability of GSS attitudinal measures of trust and trustworthiness and to identify their correlates.
3 They find no significant correlation between trusting attitudes and trusting behaviour, that is, between survey responses on trust and the amounts transferred in the Trust
Game. This result has been confirmed by Burks et al. (2003) , who extended the study of the determinants of trusting behaviour using a "Mach scale", which is a social-psychological measure of predisposition to opportunism in social interactions. Burks et al. (2003) find that the Mach scale predicts distrust but not untrustworthy behaviour. Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2002) on the other hand provide contrary evidence for a negative correlation between the Mach score and trustworthiness.
In summary, it seems that behavioural measures of trust and trustworthiness, as well as the findings related to their determinants, are far from uniform. In this paper, I attempt to determine the extent to which the Trust Game assists in studying trust and reciprocity in an investment setting. Over the last decade, a number of applications of the Trust Game have tested hypotheses relating to gender differences (Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001 ), ethnic and racial differences (Bouckaert and Dhaene, 2004 , Burks et al., 2003 , Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001 ), beliefs (Croson, 2000) , intentions (McCabe et al., 2003) , social distance (Buchan and Croson, 2004) , communication (Buchan et al., forthcoming) , and culture (Carpenter et al., 2004) . Although this literature provides interesting insights into the determinants of trust and co-operative behaviour, some of the results appear puzzling. My intention is to explore the reasons behind such results. In particular, I critically analyse the approach of Glaeser et al. (2000) and show that neglect of the equal-division behavioural norm in the Trust Game can 3 As we will see in section 2, the design of these two games differs in some respects. Whereas in the game of Berg et al. (1995) the experimenter triples the amount sent from the trustor, in Glaeser et al. (2000) the same amount is doubled. In addition, in the latter study, the authors randomly allow half of the potential trustees to make a promise of trustworthiness, in the form of cheap-talk. Finally, in Berg et al. (1995) the trustee receives $10 as a show-up fee that he or she may decide to include in the amount to be sent back.
lead to underestimation of respondents' positive attitudes towards co-operation, and can play down the extent to which they do reciprocate. This, in turn, can affect the reliability of the identification of the correlates of reciprocity.
Section 2 reviews the results of the experiments and gives a brief account of the usual interpretation in the Trust Game. In section 3, from the analysis of the extensive form of the Trust Game, I derive an additional condition for trustworthiness. The final payoffs of trustor and trustee are solved for equality, and a trustee's behavioural norm of equal division or conditional trustworthiness is derived. This is trustworthiness up to the point of equality between final payoffs. That is, a minimum level of reciprocity may occur even when the amount sent back by the trustee is strictly smaller than the amount sent forward by the trustor, as long as the "equal division" constraint is satisfied. Indeed, inequality-averse trustees do not reciprocate by equal sharing but rather take into account, in their decision to reciprocate, the amount kept by the trustor. This weaker definition of trustworthiness implies that the smaller is the amount sent forward by the trustor (and the higher the portion of the stake kept by the trustor), the smaller is the amount that a maximally inequality-averse trustee sends back. 
The trust game: the standard approach
The experiment designed by Berg et al. (1995) reproduces an investment setting where individual actual decisions can be compared to the theoretical prediction of neoclassical economics. This allows gauging the extent of neoclassical-economics "individualist bias", that is, the degree to which, in practice, the postulates of rationality and self-interest do not explain individual choices. Figure 2 shows the general extensive form of the experiment designed by Berg et al. (1995) . We will refer to this as the "Trust Game". This game, in its original form, consisted of four steps:
1. Both the trustor and the trustee are given a $10 show-up fee. For practical reasons, we indicate these as α and δ respectively for the trustor and the trustee; 2. The trustor is then given the opportunity to send an integer portion, S f ≡αx, of his $10 to the trustee. Sending money to the recipient is obviously risky but, if the trustee does not break the trust, the potential gain for the trustor is greater than $10;
3. The experimenter triples whatever amount the trustor decides to send to the trustee (in the extended form of the game, this entails multiplication by a constant k=3). This step is intended to create a social dilemma, that is, a situation where individual and group incentives differ; 4. Finally, the trustee can choose to send back to the trustor an integer portion, S b ≡y*(kαx+δ), of the amount received by the experimenter. In making this choice, as we will see later, the specific setting of the game requires the trustee to take or not to take into account his or her show-up fee.
( Figure 2 about here)
The Trust Game in Glaeser et al. (2000) differs slightly from the above. In fact:
(1) In Glaeser et al. (2000) the sender and recipient meet. Therefore, contrary
to Berg et al. (1995) , the game is not conducted in a double-blind procedure where anonymity is indeed guaranteed with respect to the other player as well as with respect to the experimenter;
(2) The trustor receives $15 rather than $10;
(3) The trustee does not receive a show-up fee, hence δ=0; It is important to bear in mind that the unique Nash Equilibrium prediction for the Trust Game is that the trustor should send nothing. Indeed, by backward induction, he or she knows that the recipient, acting rationally, has no incentive to reciprocate. Still, results from the two experiments above differ markedly from the theoretical predictions of the game.
Figures 3 and 4 show that this prediction is confirmed only 5 out of 60 times in Berg et al. (1995) and 4 out of 97 times in Glaeser et al. (2000) . How should these results be interpreted? Let us briefly first review the analytical framework and definitions adopted in the past. The concepts of trust and trustworthiness of Berg et al. (1995) and Glaeser et al. (2000) have a common theoretical justification and refer to a definition proposed by Coleman (1990) . In Foundations of Social Theory, Coleman (1990, p. 98) proposes that, "if the trustee is trustworthy, the person who places trust is better 4 Indeed, both trustor and trustee receive a $10 show-up fee for taking part in two experimental games: the trust game and the envelope game. This is paid a posteriori and may be interpreted as a fixed and equal reward for the time spent in playing the two games and replying to a survey. Hence, the difference is that, in the specific framework of the trust game, only the trustor receives an initial stake.
off than if trust were not placed, whereas if the trustee is not trustworthy, the trustor is worse off than if trust were not placed". Analytically, the sender is said to be trusting or "to place a trust on the recipient" if and only if S f >0. On the other hand, the recipient is said to be Now, taking this definition of trustworthiness as benchmark for a "non-cheating" trustee, the first part of Table 1 shows a very simple classification of trustees' responses. As it would be logical to expect, the percentage of untrustworthy trustees in Berg et al. (1995) is higher than in Glaeser et al. (2000) . 5 However, we should ask ourselves whether, by adopting
Coleman's definition of trustworthiness, we obtain a reliable measure of reciprocity or, rather, whether the trustworthiness condition is so strong that we are indeed underestimating trustees' tendency to reciprocate.
( Table 1 about here) All too often, in the context of the Trust Game (e.g., Bouckaert and Dhaene, 2004) , reciprocity is equated to trustworthiness and vice versa, ignoring the possibility that a 5 The double-blind procedure in Berg et al. (1995) excludes potential punishment threats and therefore should logically provide disincentives for trustees to reciprocate.
reciprocal pattern may arise conditionally to an equal division rule. This is the question addressed in the next section.
Introducing the condition of equal division
In recent years there have been a number of attempts at incorporating fairness into game theory and at accounting for the equity concern (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004: Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton, G. and Ockenfels, A., 2000) . These studies are driven by the desire to develop a more realistic theoretical framework capable of accounting for preferences motivated by self-interest as well as by other-regarding behavioural norms.
6
In fact, there are extensive accounts of situations in which people do not behave according to the utility maximisation principle. In experimental economics games, subjects are often found to exhibit social preferences, and to be concerned about social norms such as reciprocity or fairness. For example, in a well-known experiment on food-sharing, Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1981) investigate the relative importance of Pareto efficiency and equity as principles adopted in assessing a just distribution of goods. Though, in their experiment, subjects express personal judgement on hypothetical circumstances, the authors found that a significant number of replies are driven by equity considerations. Brosnan and de Waal (2003) conducted an experiment with a nonhuman primate, the brown capuchin monkey, and
show that, in exchanges with a human experimenter, their subjects respond negatively to unequal reward distribution. They justify their findings and attempt to generalise validity by claiming that "during the evolution of cooperation it may have become critical for individuals to compare their own efforts and payoffs with those of others" Brosnan and de Waal (2003, p. 297 ). Camerer and Thaler (1995) , in their account of the importance of manners in explaining ultimatum and dictator games outcomes, mention a study conducted by Murnighan and Saxon (1994) . The experimenters found that kindergartners playing ultimatum games behaved almost like pure income maximisers, accepting minimal offers. Camerer and Thaler (1995) interpret this result as evidence "that perhaps the tendency to reject insulting low offers is learned, as manners are".
We share this view and, in particular, we posit that trustworthy behaviour may be elicited subject to the condition of equity being satisfied. Therefore, we introduce these equity considerations in the interpretation of the results of the Trust Game. In practice, we suggest that the "equality of final payoffs" could rightly be considered as a sufficient condition for a trustworthy trustee. After all, in Glaeser et al. (2000) as well as in Berg et al. (1995) , there is no previous agreement as to the minimal amount that the trustor expects to receive back from the trustee (a procedure that, by the way, is introduced in Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003) . In both Glaeser et al. (2000) and Berg et al. (1995) , no emphasis is placed on the material attribution of $10 to the trustor but, in placing trust onto the trustee, the trustor does not specify the "desired amount" (s)he would like to have sent back. So, in these settings, it is not clear with respect to what, in particular, trustworthiness should be defined. In the absence of a clearly defined reference value (as the one the trustor indicates in Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003) , it seems advisable to adopt the less strict condition (hence, the "equal division") in order not to underestimate willingness to cooperate.
To find a weaker condition for trustworthiness, we impose the equality of payoffs in the Trust Game,
Solving for y, we obtain 
In the above equation, y e represents the share of the amount received by the trustee that he or she has to send back to the trustor such that their final payoffs are equalised. In other words, y e is the maximum share of the received amount that a maximally inequity-averse trustee would send back to the sender. We can see that, given that (x-1) is non-positive, y e is increasing in x,
Equation (2) also implies that y e takes a maximum value of ½ when x is equal to 1, that is, when the sender fully trusts the recipient. Assuming that x and y e can take any values in the interval [0,1], though this is not the case in practice, figure 5 graphs a comparison between the trustworthiness and the equal division conditions for the Trust Game conducted in Glaeser et al. (2000) . For each amount sent, the two lines represent the return ratio (the ratio between the amount returned and the amount sent) that satisfies either the trustworthiness condition or the equal division condition. The trustworthy return ratio is equal to 1, regardless of the amount sent. Indeed, for a trustee to be trustworthy, it is required that he should send back to the trustor as much as the trustor had sent forward. On the contrary, the equal division return ratio clearly depends on the amount sent. The equal division return ratio is equal to 0 for values of the amount sent equal or below $5. Indeed, when a sender sends $5, he or she keeps $10.
Hence a maximally inequality averse recipient receiving twice the amount sent (twice $5, in this case) would send back $0 to generate payoffs equality ($10, $10). For values above $5, the larger the amount sent, the larger is the equal division return ratio, although the latter increases at a decreasing rate. Finally, when the sender fully trusts the recipient (i.e., when the amount sent is equal to $15) the equal division condition coincides with the trustworthiness condition.
( Figure 5 about 
For values of AR larger than 0, AR e has a slope equal to 3/2 in the game of Glaeser et al. (2000) and equal to 2 in the game of Berg et al. (1995) , because of k being equal to 2 and 3, respectively. Moreover, as recipients cannot send back negative values (i.e., cannot punish untrusting senders), we will assume that the amount returned is equal to zero whenever ( Figure 6 about here) 7 When the trustor sends $0 to the trustee, the latter cannot take any action at all.
These findings have significant implications. In effect, if we accept the idea whereby individuals do care about equity and might take equity considerations into account in their decision to reciprocate, ignoring the equal division condition in the analysis of the Trust Game results constitutes a serious flaw. In fact, if rather than accepting that the equal division may be a sufficient condition for trustworthiness, we exclude this possibility, limiting it to trustworthy responses (on and above the trustworthiness line), we would overestimate unconditional untrustworthiness by 86%. 8 As a consequence, in those studies -such as Glaeser et al. (2000) -adopting the trustworthiness line as a lower bound for trustees' trustworthiness, the identification of the socio-demographic determinants appears substantially compromised.
9 Figure 7 shows the incorporation of the equal division constraint in the experiment conducted by Berg et al. (1995) . The only difference with respect to the above analysis is that, in this case, we have two possible equity division lines, depending on whether the recipient takes into account the show-up fee in the decision to send back a share of the tripled amount received. Indeed, it is possible that some "inequity-averse" trustees', in choosing the amount to send back, disregard their own show-up fee because they literally interpreted the instructions received and pocketed it.
(Figure 7 about here) 8 In fact, we would erroneously include in the objectively "untrustworthy" trustees' responses (14), 12 additional replies that do indeed meet a weaker constraint of trustworthiness. Therefore, we would overestimate 14 by 12/14 (i.e., by 86%). 9 Incidentally, in the experiment conducted by Glaeser et al., biased results may also be the effect of the inclusion of 6 influential observations ($15, $30) in which the sender is fully trusting and the recipient is fully altruistic. It appears to us that this aberrant behaviour is the result of a non-random pairing procedure. Our view is that those 6 recipients are indeed people that, because of a special relationship (e.g., they might be partners, brothers, cousins, very close friends, etc.), might have decided to send everything (forward to the recipient, and back to the sender). This choice, in turn, may allow the recipient to show his or her spirit of abnegation (readiness to forgo everything for friendship or love, for example) though it does not necessarily have any actual financial consequences. Indeed, just because of the assumed relationship linking each of these pairs, sender and recipient might decide to spend the total payoff to go for diner or bowling together. In this way, sender and recipient would evenly share the total payoff, though this would occur outside the game context. Therefore, there is reason to believe that Glaeser's analysis should be conducted after prior removal of these influential observations that clearly bias the results. Finally, the absence of anonymity between players introduces the problem of selection bias in the analysis of trustees' responses, as the most untrustworthy are logically removed from the sample (Karlan, forthcoming).
Finally, the last row of table 1 provides an outcome-based measure of the proportion of trustees adopting the equal division (or conditional trustworthiness) behavioural norm for the Trust Games in Berg et al. (1995) and in Glaeser et al. (2000) . From an outcome-based perspective, a significant proportion of trustees, more than a third, adopt this behavioural rule.
Moreover, notwithstanding the crucial differences in the procedure and in the structure of the two games, the percentage of conditionally trustworthy trustees is exactly the same. Future research may shed light on whether this finding constitutes an exception or is rather a general feature of such games.
There are at least two major implications of incorporating the equity division behavioural norm into the Trust Game. First, as we have just seen, equal division of final payoffs expands the room for trustworthiness behind the stricter trustworthiness constraint.
Secondly, if we accept that equity concerns play such a significant role in determining trustees' choices, then it is clear that the relative size of show-up fees plays an equally important role. To see this more clearly, we express equation (2) Glaeser et al. (2000) , the feasibility space of the Trust Game is subdivided into three areas, "altruism", "conditional trustworthiness" and "unconditional untrustworthiness", depending on the minimum constraint satisfied by the recipient's choice. This representation is also useful for understanding the result obtained in equation (6). An increase in (α/δ), that is, a distribution of show-up fees more in favour of the sender, corresponds to a downward shift of the equal division line, AR e . This, in turn, increases the probability of a lower response by the trustee for each amount sent. Therefore there seem to be two countervailing factors, one favouring co-operation and the other discouraging it, with a resulting ambiguity as to which prevails. An increase in α relative to δ implies that:
1. The sender has a higher amount to send forward to the recipient; 2. The recipient, however, has a relatively lower show-up fee, hence (s)he might be more concerned about equality of final payoffs; 3. The sender, by backward induction, might anticipate the trustee's deeper equity concern and might decide to trust the recipient even less; 4. Finally, the recipient, receiving a lower amount of trust, is probably less prone to reciprocate relative to a situation characterised by equal show-up fees.
Hence, it is still not evident whether an unequal distribution of show-up fees deters trustors from placing trust and eventually reduces the incentive to co-operate for both players. It would be interesting to conduct experiments to test for the significance of the relative stake size for the level of trust placed by trustors, of the level of reciprocity displayed by trustees, and, overall, of co-operation altogether. In this regard, Johansson-Stenman et al. (2005) find that the proportion of money sent by the trustor decreases significantly with the stake size.
However, it is still not clear whether the larger stake spurs selfishness feelings or simply introduces too high a risk in the gamble to be played (a risk that may be exacerbated by the trustee's recognition of inequality treatment). Similarly, Anderson et al. (2004, p. 373) find, in analysing contribution in public-good experiments, that "the treatment effect of inequality reduces contributions by all members of the affected group, regardless of their relative standing within the fixed payment distribution."
The effect of inequality aversion on trust and trustworthiness suggests that the debate on the link between social capital and egalitarian policies should be renewed. The pathdependency theories put forward by Putnam (1993) could certainly explain the relative backwardness of certain regions or countries with respect to others. However, the same theory cannot account for the decline in the general level of trust that appears to have occurred in the United States and other high-income countries during the last 40 years. Our result, along with the observation that some countries with the highest average level of self-reported trustNorway, Sweden, Finland, Canada -are characterised by progressive policies and a relatively even distribution of wealth, may shed light on the temporal dynamics of trust and, indirectly, on social capital. If our analysis provides support for the explanatory power of the equal division behavioural rule on trustworthiness (fraction returned) and, by backward induction, on trust (amount sent), it follows that econometric studies cannot neglect the role of inequality in the analysis of the macro determinants of self-reported trust. Indeed, the "Why" section of Putnam (2000) devotes only 2 out of one hundred pages to "pressure of money", and only in referring to the financial vulnerability of individual families. Putnam accounts for the social changes taking place in the US by mentioning a number of factors (pressures of time and money, mobility and sprawl, technology and mass media) but no role is given to wealth inequality and abandonment of egalitarian policies.
On the design of the trust game
I have suggested that the equal division condition can explain a higher proportion of trustees' replies, and can be a reason for the puzzling results related to trust and trustworthiness obtained in the experimental economics literature. Besides the shortcomings of neglecting such a behavioural norm, it is also debatable whether the Trust Game reflects actual relations of trust. The design of the game may indeed have a significant impact on experimental results. The Trust Game was designed to reproduce a situation in which cooperation enhances efficiency. Hence, in Berg et al. (1995) , the experimenter triples the amount sent by the sender so as to create a higher total outcome than if trust and reciprocity were absent. However, in the standard version of the game, the preferred social outcome depends solely on the amount of trust placed by the trustor. 10 This implies that, if the trustor places full trust on the trustee, the social outcome of the transaction will improve, regardless of the trustee's actual behaviour. This game structure may be sufficient to reproduce, in a laboratory setting, one-off interactions where, as stated by Fehr and Rockenbach (2003, p. 138) , "the trustee has superior productive opportunities for the use of economic resources".
Still, there are three major reasons why the standard design of the trust game does not correspond to all other relations of trust. First of all, if the Trust Game is to provide any useful information on trustworthiness and co-operative behaviour other than producing experimental data on trusting attitudes, it should incorporate the dynamic aspect of a trust relation. 11 This implies a repeated game and/or designing the game in such a way as to make the additional outcome -brought about by co-operation -dependent on both trust and reciprocity. Secondly, the standard version of the Trust Game introduces a perverse effect given that, when the experimenter multiplies by k the amount sent by the trustor, the trustee has indeed a higher incentive to defect as he would earn k times the amount sent. This is not a negligible effect as people's stance towards fairness, and reciprocity seems to depend on the overall stake. Rabin (1993, p. 1284) proposes that "people will not be as willing to sacrifice a great amount of money to maintain fairness as they would be with small amounts of money." This suggests that, when the profitability of defecting is high (as in the standard version of the trust game), people are more tempted to pursue their self-interest at the expense of reciprocity. 12 Finally, the Trust Game is amenable to a sociological interpretation of its results (for example, many studies draw conclusions on how trust and trustworthiness vary by gender, professional status, race, nationality, etc.). Still, to the extent to which the choices taken in the Trust Game depend on the past (reflect a subject's past experience of similar interactions, deep-rooted beliefs, and behavioural norms), the game implies an evolutionary perspective. In a repeated Trust Game, and under an evolutionary perspective, a trustee acting according to the equal division behavioural norm signals a propensity to cooperate at least as high as a trustworthy trustee's.
Indeed, in the game of Glaeser et al. (2000) , the two constraints coincide when the trustor is fully trusting. This implies that in a repeated setting, should the trustor believe that the trustee will abide by the behavioural norm of the first interaction, he or she is better off placing total trust on the trustee, regardless of whether the trustor has been matched to a trustworthy trustee or to a trustee adopting the equal division behavioural norm. In fact, in placing full trust regardless of the trustee type, the trustor could expect maximum co-operation and therefore obtain the maximum payoff. This point stands out even more in a repetition of the game in Berg et al. (1995) . Then, a utility-maximising trustor who believes that the trustee will adhere to the behavioural norm adopted in the first interaction would have a greater incentive to place trust in the trustee satisfying the equal division condition. This is particular clear if we look at figure 7, where the trustworthiness and the equal division lines intersect at the point where the amount sent equals $5. For larger amounts, a trustworthy trustee would behave in such a way as not to make the trustor worse off, even when the trustor is fully trusting. On the contrary, for amounts sent above $5, a trustee satisfying the equal division condition would make the trustor better off (as he would receive more than he had sent to the trustee). Therefore the latter trustee is particularly worth of trust.
This conclusion merits a detailed analysis aimed at gauging the relative capabilities of the two conditions (trustworthiness and equal division) in giving rise to an evolutionary stable equilibrium. 13 My feeling is that, with specific reference to the game in Berg et al. (1995) , even assuming that the trustee will always pocket his or her show-up fee, the repeated interaction with a trustee following the equity condition is more likely to produce an evolutionary stable equilibrium with full trust and full conditional trustworthiness. Indeed, should the trustor, by accident or just to experiment to see what will happen, change his strategy -deciding not to place any trust and hence ensuring $10 -he would still have an incentive to return to his previous strategy (as he could earn $15, though risking the trustee's defection). On the contrary, the repeated interaction between a trustor and a trustworthy trustee may well lead the couple to spend some time in the equilibrium (full trust, full trustworthiness) but there may eventually be a switch to the risk-dominant equilibrium (no trust, no action), since, in such a situation, an untrusting trustor runs no risk -the trustee not being able to take any action -and does not forgo any additional payoff (he would earn $10 either placing full trust or not placing trust at all).
Conclusions
Conventional economic theory is based on behavioural rules of pure self-interest.
However, experimental evidence shows that economic agents' choices are affected by behavioural rules such as altruism, trust, reciprocity and so on. Experimental economics is thereby providing an invaluable contribution in filling the gap between the assumptions of neoclassical theory and the motives underlying actual behaviour. At the same time, economic scholars are attempting to identify a common pattern in the disjoint and somewhat conflicting empirical evidence (among others, Rabin, 1993; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; and Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) and to identify a unifying model that can account for the different motives Glaeser et al. (1995) , for a level of amount sent equal to $15, the lines of trustworthiness and of equal division coincide. Therefore we assume that half of the 44 trustees sending back $15 followed the equal division behavioural norm.
